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Commando Coup at Entebbe:
Humanitarian Intervention or
Barbaric Aggression?
* * ' [I]nternational organizations are proving unable in this age-as are many
national organizations-to cope with the new format of conflict within borders-sub-
version, terror, insurgency, the whole catalogue of conflict types which so far have
baffled the international community. I think there is a serious question whether
constitutionally or unconstitutionally the United Nations or any international organi-
zation is capable of coping with many problems of internal insurgency. This may be
our single most unsolvable problem in the field of conflict control.
Arms Controlfor the Late Sixties
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
On July 10, 1976, an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security
Council was convened in response to a demand by the Ugandan Foreign Min-
ister, Juna Oris, that the Council condemn Israel for "barbaric, unprovoked
and naked aggression" against his country. He was referring, of course, to the
Israeli rescue of 104 hijacked passengers from the Entebbe Airport in Uganda
on July 4. During the course of the rescue, seven of the hijackers, twenty of the
guards at the airport, three passengers and one of the Israeli commandos lost
their lives. One must take note of the bizarre context of this complaint by the
Ugandan representative; not one word was mentioned by him concerning the
connivance and covert assistance to the hijackers afforded by the President of
Uganda, Idi Amin.
It is ironic that a former Wehrmacht officer who now serves as a United
Nations Secretary General should have characterized Israel's action at Entebbe
as "a violation of the sovereignty of a member [U.N.] state." Dr. Kurt Wald-
heim might at least have, under the circumstances, maintained a discreet
*The author acknowledges the assistance of Irving Karg, Esquire, of the Boston Bar, who did some
research in Tel Aviv on the new Israeli theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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silence, instead of volunteering a legal condemnation in disregard of his obliga-
tions as an impartial administrator. Senator William Brock (R-Tenn.) charac-
terized Waldheim's remark as "disgusting and irresponsible."
The words of the charge are "barbaric, unprovoked and naked aggression."
Is there anything "barbaric" in rescuing innocent voyagers who had been
hijacked aboard a commercial plane on its journey from Athens to Paris? Or
is the situation one which is more properly characterized as humanitarian inter-
vention? For the hijackers had proclaimed that unless some thirty-five political
prisoners in jail in Israel, England, France and Germany were returned, the
hostages would be executed.
In a thoughtful article entitled Retaliation and Irregular Warfare in Con-
temporary International Law, J. L. Taulbee I emphasizes, as others have also,
that self-defense is the only lawful use of force permitted under the Charter2
apart from Security Council action authorized under Chapter VII.3 Before an
international tribunal it is suggested that the following arguments could be
invoked to defend the Israeli rescue operation:
1. It can well be argued that the rescue at Entebbe, under the circumstances
of imminent extinction, was a humanitarian act. Professors Myres McDougal
and Michael Reisman of the Yale Law School faculty 4 have insisted that human-
itarian intervention in a situation such as the one under discussion is lawful.
McDougal and Reisman claim that since humanitarian intervention seeks
neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political independence of the
state involved, it is not only not inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations, but rather is in conformity with the most fundamental norms of the
Charter. It is, consequently, a distortion to argue that it is prohibited by Article
2(4). This is a modern, sustainable position in a problem which has had its
share of controversy in the past. P.H. Winfield, writing on the subject of inter-
vention, observed that it was one of the vaguest branches of international law. 5
He considered that intervention had been the rule since the French Revolution
and set out a detailed history of the question of the validity of intervention. At
one time termed "interference," and later "intervention" as a technical term,
it became a word of art from 1817 to 1830. Yet, since the independence of states
7 "INT'L LAW. 195 (1973).
2U.N. CHARTER, Art. 2, Par. 4.
'Hague Hijacking Convention (Convention For The Suppression Of Unlawful Seizure Of Air-
craft) 64 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 50 (1971) Treaty, signed December 16, 1970 subject to ratifica-
tion. 65 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 371 (1971) Ratification deposited September 14, 1971. See Derek
Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse To Armed Force, 66 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 1 (1972). "Few pro-
positions about international law have enjoyed more support than the proposition that under the
Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal."
'Memorandum on Humanitarian Intervention to Protect Ibos in Lillich, ed., HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, (University Press of Va., 1968).5Winfield, The History ofIntervention in InternationalLaw, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 130 (1922-23).
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was the foundation of modern international law, non-intervention was the rule,
intervention the exception. In the nineteenth century, few writers upheld the
right to intervene by force in the affairs of another country, as a principle of law.
"The essence of intervention," wrote Lawrence in his work on international
law, "is force or the threat of force in case the dictates of the intervening power
are disregarded ...There can be no intervention without, on the one hand,
the presence of force, naked or veiled, and on the other hand the absence of
consent on the part of the combatants." ' 6 On the other hand, there is no ques-
tion that a state has a right as well as a duty to protect its own nationals whether
at home or in another country.7
It is true that the Israelis were entitled to ask for a privileged position by the
rules of international law, for if a state's standard of justice with respect to its
own nationals is so low that it fails to measure up to a general norm governing
members of the family of nations, the alien is granted the right to appeal to the
average norm rather than the lower norm prevailing in the state.
The question of humanitarian intervention has a long and checkered history.
Grotius was an early subscriber to the principle that every human society and
the laws that govern that society are limited by a universally recognized prin-
ciple of humanity; and when a government, although acting within its rights
of sovereignty, violates the rights of humanity, the right of intervention may be
lawfully exercised. 8 As pointed out by Professor Richard Lillich, the United
Nations efforts in Palestine, the Congo and Cyprus may be considered as
expressions of humanitarian intervention despite the fact that they were also
complicated by an imminent threat to the peace of either regional or global
scope.'
In 1877, the United States Department of State announced, curiously, that
it could not tender a protest on humanitarian grounds without the permission
of the government in question. A year later, upon a request to protest harass-
ment of Jews in Barbary, the Department stated to its local representative, "that
there might be cases in which humanity would dictate a disregard of technical-
ities, if your personal influence would shield Hebrews from oppression." There-
after, the consul at Tangier was advised to act in such cases so far as may be
consistent with his international obligations. Other examples abound in diplo-
matic history.
This rather tentative approach offers a stark contrast to the evolving course
of the law since World War II. Human rights and freedoms, wrote Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, having become the subject of a solemn international obligation
'LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1913) p. 124.
'THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-IrTERVErxoN (Southwestern Methodist Univ. Press, 1956) p. 303.
'THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 7, at 373.
'Lillich, supra note 4, at 184.
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and one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter, are no longer a matter
which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the members of the
U.N.10 There is precedent in the Congo case. In 1964, rebels in the Congo seized
thousands of non-belligerents and held them as hostages for concessions from
the central government. When the concessions were not forthcoming, forty-
five of the civilians were killed and threats were made that the rest would be
massacred. A Belgian paratroop battalion, transported in American planes and
through British facilities, was flown in as an emergency rescue effort in which
2,000 people were rescued in four days. 1
When a state abuses its right of sovereignty by permitting within its territory the
treatment of its own nationals or foreigners in a manner violative of all universal stan-
dards of humanity, any nation may step in and exercise the right of humanitarian
intervention. 
This provides a necessary perspective for the Entebbe raid. No redress for the
voyagers could be obtained, in view of the recent history of Uganda in the civil
rights area. (See below.) It would therefore appear that the Israelis would be
left to exercise whatever rights they could to save their nationals within the
exigencies of the time allowed. And here a distinction drawn by Professor Derek
Barnett is highly relevant, between territorial integrity and territorial inviolabil-
ity, with the former being subject to the rights of other states. "3
2. Where law fails to protect members of a, society against violent wrongs,
they can hardly be expected, when provocation is unbearable, not to have
recourse to "self-help," particularly in situations where "self-help" was recog-
nized action in the pre-Charter period of international law."' Self-help covers
such responses as reproach, retribution, self-defense and the like. As Professors
McDougal and Reisman have put it:
[11f a state is grievously injured but the organized international community is in-
capable of affording timely redress, the injured party may take necessary and propor-
tionate measures to protect itself and its nationals.
A state may resort to self-defense against states or individuals in response
to the illegal and aggressive acts they have committed.' 5 The well-known Carol-
ine and McLeod incidents 6 involved certain Americans who invaded Canada,
being supplied by an American vessel, the Caroline. In reprisal, the Canadians
came over to the American side, set fire to the vessel and sent her over Niagara
Falls. The British Minister in Washington later supported this action as jus-
'
0H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW & HUMAN RIGHTS (1950) p. 178.
"Lillich, supra note 4, at 185.
"Lillich, supra note 4, at 171.
"Bowett, supra note 3.
'
4Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman, Letter to the N.Y. Times, July 16, 1976.
"C.F. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Washington, D.C.: C.B. Publishers, 1971) p. 428.
"See 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412, 906.
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tified by principles of necessity and proportionality as set out in the Caroline
case.
[W]hile it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense
do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the "necessity of that
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." 17
The principles of necessity and proportionality which have been confirmed
in the reported judgments of the military tribunals in Nuremburg and Tokyo,I 8
would not appear to have been violated by the kind and degree of the Israeli
measures at Entebbe, given the nature of the outrage and the lives in jeopardy.
3. There is a close analogy between the hijacking of the Air France plane
under discussion and piracy. 9 "Hot pursuit" is undertaken against forces using
neutral territory as a base for recurring raids. Although one can say that these
particular guerrillas had not been guilty of previous attacks on Israel (one of
them may have been involved in a previous incident), the internecine ideological
bitterness between the Arabs and the Israelis has been of long duration. Recur-
ring raids had been initiated by the PLO and various Arab guerrilla organiza-
tions. One can validly argue that since 1948 there have been four wars against
Israel launched by its neighbors or that there was one continuous war in four
phases. Israel has literally been in a state of siege since its conception.2"
Norman Podheretz, writing in Commentary," points out that the United
Nations resolution (1975) equating Zionism with racism branded the state of
Israel as an illegitimate entity, denying the right of a sovereign Israeli state of
any size or shape to exist in the Middle East. But since the essential character
of the Israeli nation had not changed since its admission to the United Nations
Organization, with its implicit acceptance as a "peace-loving" nation, that
resolution can hardly be viewed as anything other than an extra-legal action, itself
violative of the Charter's precepts, and an unconstitutional attempt to nullify
the rights of Israel as a legal entity under the law of nations.
There are solid grounds in law and history, it is submitted, for contending
that hot pursuit is a matter of self-defense where the neutral state (Uganda) has
allowed its territory to be used as a refuge by military elements of one of the
combatant parties.
In 1814, United States forces pursued the Seminole Indians into what was
Spanish territory in order to punish them for various depredations on American
1129 BR. & FOR. ST. PAPER 1129, 1138.
"See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Judgment and Sentences) 41 AM. J. OF INT'L
LAW, 172, 205-7 (1947).
"International Law and Military Operations Against Insurgents in Neutral Territory, 68 COL.
L.R. 1127.
20G. F. Will, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1976.
"July, 1973, p. 23.
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territory.22 It was contended by the United States, in defense of its action, that
the Spaniards had failed to keep their part of the bargain and that the United
States had to use self-help.23 It is axiomatic that the first duty of any govern-
ment is to protect its citizens and territory. The danger to both is apparent when
bands of insurgents or bandits regularly cross the border into neutral territory in
order to evade government forces, re-arm and re-group. The danger is exacer-
bated if either the central government or the neutral state or its political and
military representatives, at border areas (whether they sympathize with the
cause of the rebels or due to inability to properly police its territory adjacent
to the border), permit the insurgents to use this territory with impunity. Thus,
self-defense under the circumstances of modern guerrilla warfare should be
given an expanded meaning to permit the pursuit of retreating forces where
there is reason to believe that they are using neutral territory for bases of opera-
tions and future attack.24 Accordingly, the sovereign state of Uganda forfeited
its right to territorial integrity by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent
the use of its territory by belligerent forces. 2"
Let us assume arguendo that the Arab nations contend that they are still in
a state of war with Israel. Let us further assume (a justified assumption in view
of the deeds and utterances of its president) that Uganda sides with the Arab
countries. Uganda's failure to release the captured civilians was a violation of
the Hague Convention on hijacking of 1970.26 And, this failure could certainly
be construed as an act of belligerency against Israel. The late Joseph L. Kunz
in an essay entitled The Causes of War declared, "Laws of war if to be accepted
and applied in practice must strive for the correct and just balances between
on the one hand, the principles of humanity and chivalry and on the other hand,
military interests." 27 One may risk to inquire what military interests of Uganda
(or by adoption, any of the Arab countries) were involved in the hijacking of
the voyagers on the Air France plane bound for Paris?
4. Only a limited invasion of Ugandan territory occurred in this intervention.
No nation has the privilege of violating the territorial integrity of another
nation, under international law. No action should be taken by one nation
against the territorial integrity and political independence of another nation.
Did the action of the commandos in freeing the hijacked passengers in any way
threaten the territorial integrity and political independence of Uganda? Since
"The Spaniards had undertaken to keep the Indians at peace with the United States were unable
to control the marauding bands of Indians.
"InternationalLaw and Military Operations Against Insurgents in Neutral Territory, 68 COL. L.
REV. 1127.
24Supra note 23, at 1134.
I'Supra note 23, at 1139.
"See HAGUE CONVENTION, Art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 supra note 3.
"THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press., 1968) pp. 868, 873.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 2
Commando Coup at Entebbe 337
the entire escapade lasted less than one hour,28 and its objective was solely to
liberate imprisoned civilians whose lives were in danger, merely to pose the
question provides the answer. There was nothing in that country that the Is-
raelis wanted except the return of the captives delivered there by the hijackers.
Nor did it appear to the Ugandans at any time that the rescue party had any
other interests in mind.
5. Both Israel and Uganda (1972) have adhered to the Hijacking Treaty,"
which required Uganda to take action against the hijackers. In this the treaty
differs from the Tokyo convention3 ° (which became effective in December,
1969), which does not make hijacking an international crime, but leaves that
determination to the discretion of the individual states. The evidence essentially
supports the view that the escapade had been planned with Entebbe as the
destination of the hijackers. Daniel P. Moynihan, former United States Ambas-
sador to the United Nations,31 claims that Amin met the plane, embraced the
terrorists, arranged for his soldiers to guard the hostages and supplied the
hijackers with everything they required.
Israel now claims jurisdiction over an act abroad "which would be an offense
if it had been committed in Israel and which harmed or was intended to harm,
the life, person, health, freedom or property of a national or resident of
Israel." 32 The rationale behind this new theory of expanded jurisdiction is based
on the inadequacy of national legislation in punishing offenses committed
within the territory against the vital interests of a foreign state.33 Here, there
is no question that no redress could be obtained in view of the recent history
of Uganda in the civil rights area. It would therefore appear that the Israelis
would be left to exercise whatever rights they could to rescue their nationals
within the exigencies of the time allowed.
6. Collateral to the central issue of the legitimacy of the Israeli action is
whether it violated the United States Foreign Military Sales Act of 1961 by
employing three C-130 military transports to carry the assault party to Entebbe
and return the hostages to Israel. Although this relates more to whether a
national statute was disregarded, the question of self-defense is inevitably raised
by it. The pertinent portion of the statute reads as follows:3
2 See W. STEVENSON, NINETY MINUTES AT ENTEBBE (NY: Bantam 1976).
" he United States ratified it in 1971.
"The Tokyo Convention On Offenses And Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, 2 INT'L L.
MAT. 1042 (1963); see RHYNE, supra note 15, at 113.
"The Totalitarian Terrorists, 9 NEW YORK MAGAZINE (July 26, 1976) p. 38.
"Section 2B Amendment to the Offenses Committed Abroad Law 5716-1955 (see note 16 in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23).
"See Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli
Precedent in International Law, Note in 72 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1974).
"422 U.S.C. § 2754.
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Defense articles and defense services shall be sold by the United States Government
under this chapter to friendly countries solely for internal security, for legitimate self-
defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective ar-
rangements.
Although the purpose to which the military transports were put was not,
strictly speaking, "internal security," it does not stretch the context of the
phrase too far to say that the errand they were sent on involved external security.
On that basis, a case can be made that legitimate self-defense was involved in
this project.
It appears that the final decision to attempt the rescue was approved by the
Israeli Government only twenty-four hours before the daring rescue took place.
It could be argued that there was, under the circumstances of the case, insuf-
ficient time to obtain approval from the United States.3" If there had been, it
is by no means clear that the United States would have condemned the use of
the American-built Hercules cargo planes and the Boeing 707 jets, one of which
was a hospital plane, for the purpose contemplated.
The record of Idi Amin's monstrous treatment of his own subjects, from the
heartless expulsion of 80,000 Asians36 and the spoliation of their possessions,"
to the official assassinations of dissidents and potential rivals (to say nothing
of the recently reported genocidal campaign against thousands of minority
tribes-people in Uganda), left little reason for the Israeli Government to rely
on Amin's humane impulses. That conviction was, of course, confirmed by the
subsequent murder of a hospitalized hostage whose body was never found. His
conduct mocks Ugandan adherence to the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity (Amin was president of that organization), which articulates the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in its Preamble and in Article 2. This compact
explicitly condemns in Article 3 all forms of political assassination. A fortiori,
the assassination of a group for political reasons would be included.
A basic principle of law is that he who comes into court should come with
clean hands. Idi Amin, whose country has violated the principles of Article 6
of the United Nations Charter, is subject to expulsion by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Yet this statesman con-
demns Israel for what is argued here as a proper and humane act under the
principles of international law, recognized by all peoples with a vestigial sense
of humanity and justice.
"The Israeli Cabinet gave official approval on Saturday, July 3rd and Sunday, July 4th.
"
6See Frank Wooldridge and Vishnu D. Sharma, Expulsion Of Ugandan Asians, 9 INT'L L. 30,
48 (1975). The Ugandan Asians were not allowed to submit reasons against their expulsion or to
have their casqs reviewed by any competent legal authority.
"K.C. Kotecha, The Shortchanged: Uganda Citizenship Laws and How They Were Applied to Its
Asian Minority, 9 INT'L LAW. 1, 25 (1975).
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